Accident at Fox, Utah
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON
INVESTIGATION NO. 3047
THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
AT FOX,
UTAH, ON
DECEMBER 14, 1946
SUMMARY
Railroad: Western Pacific
Date: December 14, 1946
Location: Fox, Utah
Kind of accident: Head-end collision
Trains involved: Passenger : Freight
Train numbers: Extra 175 East : Extra 57 West
Engine numbers: 175 : 57
Consists: 13 cars : 10 cars, caboose
Estimated speeds: 15 m.p.h. : 5 m.p.h. (backward motion)
Operation: Timetable and train orders
Track: Single; tangent; 0.10 percent ascending grade eastward
Weather: Clear
Time: About 6:14:30 a.m.
Casualties: 80 injured
Cause: Failure of inferior train to provide adequate protection
after having failed to clear main track at time required by the
rules
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
INVESTIGATION NO. 3047
IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE
ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.
THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
January 27, 1947
Accident at Fox, Utah, on December 14, 1946, caused by failure of
the inferior train to provide adequate protection after having
railed to clear main track at time required by the rules.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the
above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to
Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.
PATTERSON, Commissioner:
On December 14, 1946, there was a head-end collision between a
passenger train and a freight train on the Western Pacific Railroad
at Fox, Utah, which resulted in the injury of 77 passengers, 1
dining-car employee and 2 train-service employees. This accident was
investigated in conjunction with a representative of the Public
Service Commission of Utah.
Location of Accident and Method of Operation
This accident occurred on that part of the Eastern Division
extending between Wendover and Roper, Utah, 124.1 miles, a
single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable and
train orders. There is no block system in use. At Fox, 114.5 miles
east of Wendover, a siding 3,992 feet in length parallels the main
track on the south. The east switch of the siding is 1,951 feet east
of the station. The accident occurred on the main track 132 feet
east of the east siding-switch. From the west there are, in
succession, a tangent 1,350 feet in length, a 1º curve to the left
1,525 feet and a tangent 1,328 feet to the point of accident and
about 1 mile eastward. At the point of accident the grade is 0.10
percent ascending eastward.
Operating rules read in part as follows:
5. * * * The time applies to the switch where an inferior train
enters the siding; * * *
35. The following signals must be used by flagmen: * * *
Night signals--A red light,
A white light,
Torpedoes and Fusees.
S-71. A train is superior to another train by right, class, or
direction.
Right is conferred by train orders; * * *
Right is superior to class or direction. * * *
S-87. An inferior train must keep out of the way of opposing
superior trains and failing to clear the main track by the time
required by rule must be protected as prescribed by Rule 99. * * *
Note.- An extra must clear the time of an opposing extra which is
given over it not less than five minutes. * * *
99. When a train stops under circumstances in which it may be
overtaken by another train, the flagman must go back immediately
with flagman's signals a sufficient distance to insure full
protection. * * *
The front of the train must be protected in the same way, when
necessary, by the brakeman; if not available, the fireman. * * *
211 (C). An train orders * * * must be shown by conductor to at
least one brakeman, and to others when practicable. They must be
shown by engineer to fireman and, when practicable, to forward
brakeman. Brakeman at and fireman must road and return them, and
should there be occasion to do so, remind conductor or engineer of
their contents.
FORMS OF TRAIN ORDERS
G. Extra Trains. * * *
(3) Eng 77 run extra leaving A Thursday Feb 17th as follows with
right over * * *
Leave A eleven thirty 11 30 p.m. * * *
E one forty seven 1 47 a.m. * * *
This order may be varied by specifying the kind of extra and the
particular trains over which the extra shall or shall not have
right. Opposing trains over which the extra is thus given right must
clear the time of the extra not less than five minutes; * * *
Between points 31.19 miles west and 4.11 miles east of the point of
accident the maximum authorized speeds are 60 miles per hour for
passenger trains and 40 miles per hour for freight trains. Between
points 4.11 miles and 9.21 miles east of the point of accident the
maximum authorized speed for all trains is 20 miles per hour.
Description of Accident
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At Wendover the crew of Extra 175 East, an east-bound passenger
train, received copies of train orders No. 44 and No. 7 reading in
part as follows:
Order No. 44
Engs 313 and 175 run as two extras leaving Wendover Saturday Dec.
14th as follows with right over all trains except first class trains
and each other:
Leave Wendover Two one 201 AM * * *
Garfield Four Thirty Six 436 AM
Fox Four Forty six 446 AM
Buena Vista Four Fifty one 451 AM
Arrive Salt Lake City * * *
Order No. 7
Extra 175 east run one 1 hour thirty 30 mins late on Order No. 44
Garfield is 7.7 miles west of Fox, and Buena Vista and Salt Lake
City are, respectively, 3.5 and 7.2 miles east of Fox. Extra 175
East consisted of one baggage car, five sleeping cars, one dining
car, five sleeping cars and one observation sleeping car, in the
order named. All cars were of steel construction. This train
departed from Wendover at 3:50 a.m., passed Garfield, the last open
office, at 6:06 a.m., passed the east siding-switch at Fox about
6:14:30 a.m. and while moving at an estimated speed of 15 miles per
hour it collided with Extra 57 West at a point 132 feet east of the
east siding-switch.
At Roper, the last open office, 9.6 miles east of Fox, the crew of
Extra 57 West, a west-bound freight train, received copies of train
orders No. 44 and No. 7. This train, consisting of engine 57, 10
cars and a caboose, departed from Roper at 5:20 a.m., departed from
Buena Vista about 6:05 a.m. and stopped about 6:12 a. m., with the
engine standing immediately east of the east siding-switch at Fox.
About 2 minutes later, while this train was moving in backward
motion at an estimated speed, of 5 miles per hour, it was struck by
Extra 175 East.
The front ends of the engines of both trains and the cab of the
engine of Extra 57 West were damaged. The first two cars of Extra
175 East were derailed and damaged.
The conductor and the fireman of Extra 175 East were injured.
The weather was clear and it was dark at the time of the accident,
which occurred about 6:14:30 a.m.
During the 30-day period preceding the day of the accident, the
average daily movement in the vicinity of point of accident was
11.53 trains.
Discussion
The rules governing operation on this line provide that an inferior
train must keep out of the way of opposing superior trains, and
inferior trains must clear the time of opposing superior trains not
less than 5 minutes. If an inferior train fails to clear the time of
an opposing superior train, flag protection must be provided.
The crew of each train held copies of train orders No. 44 and No. 7.
Train order No. 44 gave Extra 175 East right over all trains except
first-class trains between Wendover and Salt Lake City, and required
Extra 175 East to wait at Garfield, 7.7 miles west of Fox, until
4:36 a.m., at Fox until 4:46 a.m. and at Buena Vista, 3.5 miles east
of Fox, until 4:51 a.m., Train order No. 7 required Extra 175 East
to run 1 hour 30 minutes late on train order No. 44. Under the
provisions of these orders, Extra 175 East was due to leave Garfield
at 6:06 a.m., Fox at 6:16 a.m. and Buena Vista at 6:21 a.m. Under
the rules, the times specified for Extra 175 East at Garfield, Fox
and Buena Vista applied at the east switch of the siding at each of
these stations, and Extra 57 West, which was inferior to Extra 175
East by right, was required to be into clear at Fox not later than
6:11 a.m., if it proceeded to that station to meet Extra 175 East,
Extra 175 East passed Garfield at 6:06 a.m. and Extra 57 West
departed from Buena Vista about 6:05 a.m. There is no siding between
Buena Vista and Fox. Extra 175 East and Extra 57 West collided about
6:14:30 a. m., at a point 132 feet east of the east siding-switch at
Fox.
As Extra 175 East was approaching Fox the speed was about 50 miles
per hour. The brakes of this train had been tested and had
functioned properly en route. The enginemen were maintaining a
lookout ahead. The conductor and the front brakeman were in the
third car, a trainmaster was in the fifth car and the flagman was in
the rear car. Each member of the crew and, the trainmaster had
compared time with each other and with a standard clock, and there
was only a few seconds variation in their watches. They had read the
train orders involved and each understood the requirements of these
orders. The enginemen said that the first they knew of anything
being wrong was when their engine was approaching the east end of
the curve about 1,500 feet west of the east siding-switch. Then the
fireman saw the reflection of the headlight of Extra 57 West and
called a warning to the engineer. The engineer immediately moved the
brake valve to emergency position, but the collision occurred before
the train could be stopped. No flagging signal was seen or heard by
these employees in this vicinity. The fireman said that he last
looked at his watch in the vicinity of Garfield at 6:06 a.m. The
engineer was positive that the time shown by his watch was 6:15:40
a.m. when his engine was in the vicinity of the west siding-switch
at Fox. The conductor and the front brakeman said that they observed
the time as 6:14 a.m. when their train was in the vicinity of the
west sidings-switch, and, because no action had been taken by the
engineer to reduce the speed, the conductor sounded a warning signal
on the train air-signal system then opened the emergency air valve
on the third car. The trainmaster and the flagman did not observe
the time after the train passed Garfield. The trainmaster said that
immediately after the accident the time shown by his watch was 6:15
a.m.
The crew of Extra 57 West understood that, under the provisions of
the train orders involved, their train was required to be into clear
at Fox not later than 6:11 a.m., and that flag protection was
required to be furnished against Extra 175 East west of the east
siding-switch if their train was not clear of the main track at the
required time. These employees said that they consulted their
watches and read the train orders before their train passed Buena
Vista, and they were confident that sufficient time remained for
their train to be into clear at Fox not later than 6:16 a.m. They
thought the time was about 6:11 a.m. or 6:12 a.m. when their train
stopped immediately east of the east siding-switch at Fox. Then the
front brakeman lined the switch for entry to the siding and
displayed a lighted red fusee in the vicinity of the switch.
However, before action was taken to move Extra 57 West into clear
the engineer saw the reflection of the headlight of the approaching
train, and he took immediate action to move his train eastward in
backward motion. Extra 57 West was moving eastward at a speed of
about 5 miles per hour when the collision occurred. Considering that
Extra 57 West consisted of only an engine, ten cars and a caboose,
it is probable this train could have been into clear at Fox a few
seconds before 6:16 a.m. if Extra 175 East had not passed the
clearance point at the east siding-switch before that time. However,
if Extra 57 West had been into clear at Fox not later than 6:11
a.m., as required by the rules, or had provided adequate protection
against Extra 175 East after 6:11 a.m., this accident could have
been averted.
Trains are operated on this line by timetable and train orders only.
If an adequate block system had been in use, these opposing trains
would not have been permitted to occupy the same block
simultaneously. No recommendation is made here concerning additional
protection for operation of trains at the maximum authorized speed
disclosed in this investigation, because there is now pending before
the Commission docket No. 29543, which is an investigation
instituted May 20, 1946, by the Commission on its own motion, to
determine whether it is necessary, in the public interest, to
require any common carrier by railroad to install block signal
system, interlocking, automatic train stop, train control and/or cab
signal devices, and/or other similar appliances, methods and systems
intended to promote safety of railroad operation, upon the whole or
any part of its railroad on which any train is operated at a speed
of 50 or more miles per hour.
Cause
It is found that this accident was caused by failure of the inferior
train to provide adequate protection after having failed to clear
main track at time required by the rules.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this twenty-seventh day of January,
1947.
By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.
W. P. BARTEL,
(SEAL) Secretary.